I. INTRODUCTION
Extreme natural hazards are well known in history. Both the Gilgamesh Epic and the Old Testament describe epic floods. 1 The historic approach of the American people has been
II. THE REALITY OF WILD NATURE VERSUS THE HUBRIS OF HUMANITY
We now understand natural phenomenon can defy the hubris and ingenuity of humans.
A. The "Extreme" Forces of Nature
Every state is at risk for extreme natural hazards, which defy human control. "Extreme hazards" is a misnomer. Natural hazards can be geologic or meteorological. A definition of natural hazard is "those elements of the physical environment, harmful to man and caused by forces extraneous to him." 9 Nature is nature. It can be mild or fierce. Extreme forces of nature may be presently uncontrollable by humans, but they are natural forces. Great cost in lives, property, and dollars demonstrate the limits of human ability to control geological and meteorological risks. Humans cannot prevent or deter the extreme, unavoidable forces of nature, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, tsunamis, volcanoes, ice storms, and wildfires 10 nor more common risks such as flooding.
Uncontrollable forces of nature are foreseeable to experts and students of history. A tornado in Kansas, volcanic eruption in Washington, earthquake in Los Angeles, hurricane in Florida, tsunami in Alaska, or a severe ice storm in the Northeast 11 are highly foreseeable, even if rare as major incidents. Two Though triggered by natural events such as floods and earthquakes, disasters are increasingly man-made. Some disasters (flood, drought, famine) are caused more by environmental and resource mismanagement than by too much or too little rainfall. The impact of other disasters, which are triggered by acts of nature (earthquake, volcano, hurricane) are magnified by unwise human actions. 12 Every state is at risk for earthquakes, but the two fault lines which pose the greatest risks are on the West Coast. Other regions impacted by earthquakes are the Intermountain West; the Mississippi Valley; Missouri; and Charleston, South Carolina. 13 The San Andreas and Cascadia Faults cover the three coastal states on the West Coast, while the New Madrid Fault is a threat in the Mississippi Valley. 14 The Pacific Ring of Fire contains live, but mostly dormant, volcanoes which put the West Coast from California to Alaska and Hawaii at risk. 15 Tornado Alley spans the mid-section of the United States from Texas north to Canada. Oklahoma has witnessed several major tornadoes in recent years. 16 Alabama, Louisiana, and 14. The New Madrid Fault set off three large earthquakes between December 1811 and February 1812. The earthquakes were so intense as to set off church bells on the East Coast. The good news is that the affected area was sparsely settled two centuries ago. John Rafferty, New Madrid Earthquakes of 1811-12, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Dec. 14, 2011), https://www.britannica.com/event/New-Madrid-earthquakes-of-1811-1812; Summary of 1811-1812 New Madrid Earthquakes Sequence, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., https://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/events/1811-1812newmadrid/summary.php (last visited May 25, 2017). 16. Moore, Oklahoma experienced five tornadoes in five years. The most severe was on May 20, 2013. Twenty-four died, including seven children in their school, when the tornado struck. Two hundred and twelve were injured, over 1,000 homes destroyed, Mississippi also experience severe tornadoes. 17 Tornadoes are not limited to Tornado Alley any more than seismic risks are limited to the Cascadia, New Madrid, and San Andreas Faults. For example, New England periodically experiences tornadoes. A F3 tornado 18 struck central and western Massachusetts on June 1, 2011. 19 Three hundred and fifty homes and businesses were destroyed and over 1,500 damaged in Springfield and surrounding communities. 20 The tornado's path was thirtynine miles long. 21 Wildfires are a major threat in the West 22 and other regions domestically and internationally experience wildfire threats. 23 and much of Moore leveled. Jon Schuppe, Moore, Oklahoma Slammed by Five Tornadoes in Five Years, NBC NEWS (Mar. 26, 2015, 12:25 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/5-tornadoes-5-years-moore-oklahoma-dustsagain-n330561.
The deadliest tornado in American history was the March 18, 1925 Tri-State Tornado, which plowed through thirteen counties in southwestern Missouri, southern Illinois, and southwestern Indiana. Six-hundred and ninety-five deaths were recorded dead along with 2,027 injuries. It cut a swath 219 miles long by up to one mile wide. The average speed was sixty-two miles-per-hour, but it reached up to seventy-three miles-per-hour. 18. Hurricanes are usually measured on the Fujita Scale. An F2 will have winds between 113-157 mph whereas a F5's winds will be between 261-318 mph. Flooding is a major risk in much of the United States, even in arid areas where sudden thunderstorms or cloud bursts can cause flash floods. The mountain valleys of Appalachia and the Rockies are subject to flash floods, often with little warning. 24 Parts of the country are protected by levees, as in California's Central Valley, New Orleans, and major stretches of the Mississippi River. New Orleans depends on both levees and pumps to protect itself from flooding. 25 If both fail, as occurred during Hurricane Katrina, the consequences are catastrophic for New Orleans and the surrounding parishes. 26 Just as a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, a levee system is only as strong as its weakest levee. In this respect the levee system protecting the Central Valley is believed to be weak. 27 Hurricanes are a constant threat along the Gulf Coast and eastern seaboard. Frequency is greater in the Southeast then the Northeast, but Hurricane Sandy, which ravaged New Jersey and New York, 28 is not a historical anomaly. The builtup environment on Cape Cod, Long Island, and along the littoral zone put those regions at risk for flooding like that seen in Hurricane Sandy, 29 Normal weather conditions, such as droughts, heat waves, lightning, fog, frost, blizzards, and wind storms are common in many areas. 33 They often present great dangers, but residents have learned to live and cope with these risks; 34 these events often provide advance warnings of their onset that residents should be familiar with.
Extreme natural hazards are different. Many extreme hazards can be identified, but the identification of risks is but a preliminary step in controlling the risk, which is still often outside human capability. For example, hydrologists can map floodplains and geologists can identify seismic zones, but they cannot necessarily predict the timing, severity, and locale of impact. Thus, a general recognition of a potential extreme hazard does not necessarily allow for specific predictions. The timing of an earthquake, its location, duration, velocity, magnitude, point of impact, and direction are still unforeseeable. Tornadoes can often be tracked with warnings 29. Both Long Island and Cape Cod stick out into the Atlantic. Storms that might otherwise skirt the coast may strike them head-on. available to seek shelter, but the locus of a tornado touchdown is unpredictable. 35 Similarly, even if the timing and course of hurricanes are generally foreseeable, the path of destruction is not. Where and when they make landfall is uncertain. Two prime examples are Hurricanes Rita and Ike. Both hurricanes had the potential to rival Katrina with their impacts. They inflicted substantial damage to coastal areas. 36 Rita mostly missed Texas, but struck New Orleans, re-flooding part of the city because the failed levees had not been completely restored. 37 Hurricane 
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III. THE LIMITS OF HUMANS
Natural risks persist despite the greatest efforts of engineers. Try as they might, humans often lack the capacity to control extreme forces of nature, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, and volcanoes. Their actions may even worsen the effects of natural hazards.
The reality is that every major disaster, even of seemingly natural origin, will undoubtedly involve human fault of some sort; a combination of poor decisions and acts of negligence will often coalesce to magnify impact and damages. 43 It could be a judgment call, but quite often negligence lies in planning, design, construction, operations, maintenance or inspection. Deferred maintenance may especially be a problem with older facilities and systems.
The famous architect Ian McHarg taught us to design with nature to minimize risks, to build with, as opposed to, nature, and thereby minimize potential environmental problems and natural hazards. 44 Unfortunately, his advice has often been ignored. 45 For example, humans filled in wetlands and paved the upriver areas, increasing the risks downstream. 46 Inland wetlands can serve as a giant sponge. Draining, dredging, or filling them, paving the land, and building upstream, increases downstream flooding risks by increasing the water flow. 47 Pervious layers of soil are replaced with impervious layers of asphalt, cement, roofing, and tile. Great challenges exist in fighting the forces of nature. Meteorologists can track the course of a hurricane, but cannot predict exactly where and when it will strike land. Science can map the major fault lines, but cannot predict when and where "The Big One" will occur. 48 Furthermore, the ferocity of the natural hazards often cannot be tempered by engineering and design measures. Facilities and structures have design limits, 49 which may be inadequate against extreme natural risks. 50 Try as they might, humans cannot tame nature. They may temper the rivers, but they cannot prevent flooding. Rivers exceed flood levels even when dammed and channeled. Saturated soils and heavy precipitation can exceed the storage capacity of the ground and reservoirs. Little protection can also be offered to those living on hillsides and mountains against large runoffs. 51 Humans remain at risk of geological and meteorological forces. Most rivers, streams, creeks, and dry washes do not flood out continually. The levees, dams, and diversions provide a large, but not absolute, margin of safety for the "normal" hazards of nature. 52 Congress recognized the impossibility of preventing all flooding when it expressly retained sovereign immunity for water control projects, which include a flood control purpose. 53 Human activity can reduce natural risks, but also enhance upon the experts in adopting the restricted zones recommended by the United States Forest Service. 58 Red zones and blue zones were created. 59 The inner red zone was essentially off limits to everyone. 60 The outer blue zone allowed limited access through a permit system. 61 The Washington Department of Emergency Services later recognized that the initial zones did not reflect the changing dynamics of the volcano. They prepared proposed revisions to the zones. However, the volcano erupted on May 18, 1980 without warning, before the Governor could act upon the proposed revisions. 62 Sixty people, mostly beyond the red zone, were killed or missing in the eruption.
The eruption exceeded the red zone on one side of the mountain, but left unscathed some of the restrictive areas on the opposite side. Fourteen of the victims filed suit, alleging negligent drawing of the restrictive zones. Conversely, unscathed merchants on the other side of the mountain sued because their community was not removed from the restricted zone prior to the eruption. 63 They sought their business losses from the restrictions. In other words, the zones were overinclusive on one side and under-inclusive on the other, as the volcano over erupted on one side and under-erupted on the other. The actual eruption was ten to fifteen times greater than the previous largest known eruption of Mount St. Helens, and fifteen times larger than an expert's worst prediction. 64 None of the experts accurately predicted the eruption. 65 The cases were filed in state court alleging a cause of action under Washington's Tort Claims Act. 66 The state won both cases. 67 The establishment of a restricted zone of entry around Mount St. Helens was viewed as essential to the preservation and maintenance of life, health, property, and the public peace. The Governor made a considered policy decision in closing areas around the mountain relying upon expert advice. 68 The decision to establish a safety zone "requires the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment and expertise," 69 and while hindsight for lawyers is the best test of foreseeability, experts and emergency managers must make the best judgment they can based on the state and availability of scientific knowledge at the time.
The Mount St. Helens litigation is an example of the best experts being unable to fully predict or control natural hazards, such as volcanic eruptions. The authorities and experts made the best decisions they could under the circumstances and in light of the known science.
Mount Rainier may be a dormant volcano, but the prognosis is grim should it awaken. The damages would greatly exceed those of Mount St. Helens. The potential mudflows have been mapped, with an estimated 100,000 persons living in homes built on debris washed down the mountain by catastrophic debris flows. 70 Washington 74 The landslide was on a known dangerous slide area, but the County failed to warn the residents of the area of this risk, 75 which remains subject to landslide risks. 76 In litigation, a legal argument was made that the state failed to warn the citizens that they were at risk from the landslide. The Washington Supreme Court earlier held that the state had a duty to disclose avalanche dangers, 77 since these avalanche and landslide risks are often known and mapped. The potential danger zone is highly predictable based on prior slides and geologic studies, unlike volcanic eruption zones. 78 The state settled the Oso Landslide case for $50 million, and a private defendant settled for $10 million. 79 Liability was reached in the Oso Landslide because the risks were known to the state, the residents could have been warned, and the disaster avoided. 80 The volcanic eruption of Mount St. Helens was different. There, only general 
B. The Mississippi River and New Orleans: A Sisyphean Exercise in Flood Control
The Mighty Mississippi is a prime example of the best engineering and levees restraining what might be called "normal" floods but unsuccessful in controlling extreme flooding. New Orleans was settled in 1718 by the French; occupants from then on have battled the elements.
The hubris of Americans was exemplified by the Chief of Engineers of the United States Army Corps of Engineers in 1926. He wrote, after surveying the massive levee system lining the Mississippi, the Mighty Mississippi could be controlled to prevent the "destructive effects of floods." 82 Mark Twain, a former Mississippi River pilot, held the opposite view in the nineteenth century:
One who knows the Mississippi will promptly avernot aloud, but to himself-that 10,000 river commissions, with the mines of the world at their back, cannot tame that lawless stream, cannot curb it or confine it, cannot say to it, Go here or Go there, and make it obey; cannot save a shore which it has sentenced. 83 The Mighty Mississippi quickly validated Mark Twain with the historic Great Flood of 1927, which inundated 16,570,627 acres over 170 counties in seven states. 84 Over 162,000 homes were flooded and 41,487 buildings destroyed. 85 Fatalities range between 250 and 500 persons. 86 The 1927 flood was not an anomaly. covered eight months and impacted nine states. 87 An estimated 54,000 persons were evacuated and over 50,000 homes damaged or destroyed. 88 The high-water mark of the Mississippi at St. Louis reached a record forty-nine to fiftyeight feet. 89 The excessive precipitation caused the largest flood ever measured in St. Louis. 90 Five towns were completely inundated with Hannibal, Louisiana, and Clarksville, Missouri under water for 153 consecutive days. 91 Over twenty million acres of land were inundated in the nine states. 92 The sixmonth flood period was caused by a previous wet fall with saturated soils, normal to above normal snow accumulation in winter, rapid spring snowmelt, and heavy thunder storms. 93 The flooding risks on the Mississippi differ between the Upper Mississippi and the Lower Mississippi because the Lower Mississippi is wider and deeper with a greater carrying capacity than the upper Mississippi. 94 The Army Corps of Engineers has further reduced the flood risks to the New Orleans area from upstream through diversion facilities. Thus, the flood waters tend to have a lesser impact on the Louisiana segments of the River. The bypass facilities are first above New Orleans through the Morganza Spillway into the Atchafalaya and thence into the Gulf, and second through the Bonnet Carre into Lake Pontchartrain. Severe flood waters are thereby diverted away from New Orleans to other areas in Louisiana. 95 87. NAT'L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., THE GREAT FLOOD OF 1993 x (1994). The un-channeled Mississippi River in its natural state is an example of natural forces constantly changing the natural environment. The potential always exists for the river to overwhelm human defenses. The Mississippi River, pursuant to its wandering history, wants to bypass Baton Rouge, New Orleans and the industrial complex along the current banks of the Mississippi, and follow the Atchafalaya to the Gulf, west of New Orleans. 96 The Army Corps of Engineers manages a river control system, which funnels 70 percent of the Mississippi through its current course to New Orleans and 30 percent to the Atchafalaya. 97 The main flooding risk in New Orleans comes from hurricanes blowing up the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain, 98 and overflowing the levees, as occurred with Hurricane Katrina. New Orleans has been struck nine times before Katrina, including the major hurricanes of Betsy in 1965 99 and Camille in 1969. 100 It is highly foreseeable that New Orleans will be struck again, many times. A prescient expert's worst case scenario was that New Orleans could become a twenty foot' deep lake. The storm surge would enter Lake Pontchartrain, overflow the levees, and pour into the city. The surviving levees would trap the flood water within the city. 101 Much of that scenario transpired with Hurricane Katrina.
The weakened levees failed during Katrina. Over 8 percent of New Orleans and much of the surrounding area was flooded. 102 Several postmortem studies were undertaken to determine the causes of the disaster. A Corps of Engineers Study found "[t]he storm exceeded design criteria, but the performance was less than the design intent." 103 Fifty levees failed, forty-six of which were caused by overtopping 104 and erosion, and four by foundation failures. 105 The overtopping of the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal (IHNC) exceeded design levels. The structure had shrunk by two feet over thirty-five years, illustrating the shrinking nature of the ground in the New Orleans area. 106 The flooding was compounded because many of the pumping stations were not designed with the capacity to handle large storms. 107 Earlier hurricanes exposed the vulnerability of New Orleans. 108 A Category 4 hurricane struck New Orleans in 1915. A fifteen to twenty foot storm surge swept up the Mississippi, overwhelming the levees. Lake Pontchartrain rose six feet over sea level, overtopping its embankments. 109 A Category 3 hurricane in 1947 also overwhelmed defenses along Lake Pontchartrain and the western wall of the 17th Street Canal. Flooding engulfed thirty square miles of Jefferson County and nine square miles of Orleans Parish. 110 Hurricane Betsy in 1965 was very damaging to the city. The eastern part of the city was flooded when the Industrial Canal's embankments failed. The storm surge was twelve feet above sea level. 111 The 17th Street and Industrial Canals also failed during Hurricane Katrina.
The Corps has rebuilt the levee system protecting the greater New Orleans area, but design limits will only protect to a 100-year storm hurricane. 112 Katrina started as a Category 5 hurricane and downsized to a Category 3 when it struck New Orleans. Thus, a high probability exists that New Orleans will again fall victim to a major hurricane despite the rebuilt levees.
Both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were Category 5 hurricanes during their life. The Great Miami Hurricane of 1926 was a Category 4 when it struck downtown Miami. Similarly, Hurricane Hugo was also a category 4 when it hit Charleston. Camille was a Category 5 when it reached the Mississippi Coast on August 17, 1969.
The Mississippi remains untamable by humans.
C. Southern California: An Environment of Extreme Natural Hazards
California is known for its seismic risks, but it is also subject to recurring periods of extreme weather, ranging from drought to flooding. 113 A normal cycle is heavy rains, followed by 110. Id.
Id. at 5. 112. See Mark Schleifstein, New Orleans Area's Upgraded Levees Not Enough for
Next 'Katrina,' Engineers Say, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (August 18, 2015, 1:18 PM), http://www.nola.com/futureofneworleans/2015/08/new_levees_inadequate_for_next.ht ml. A 100 year flood event is that on average a flood of this magnitude will occur once in 100 years. Since it is an average, the 100 year event could occur more than once in a century or skip a century.
See B. LYNN INGRAM & FRANCES MALAMUD-ROAM, Foreword to THE WEST WITHOUT WATER: WHAT VAST FLOODS, DROUGHTS, AND OTHER CLIMATIC CLUES TELL US ABOUT TOMORROW at xiii-xiv (2013) (ebook). I remember growing up in San
Francisco periodically hearing of recurrent flooding in Guerneville on the Russian River in Sonoma County and Topanga Canyon near Malibu. Documented flooding in Guerneville occurred in 1940, 1943, 1955, 1958, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1969, 1970, 1974, 1978, 1983, 1986, 1995 flooding, and then drought and wildfires. 114 Few are aware of the history of major flooding in Southern California. The Santa Ana River is only ninety-six miles long, but it is the longest river in Southern California. 115 It drains a watershed of 2,650 square miles in Los Angeles County, Riverside County, San Bernardino County, and Orange County from whence it flows into the Pacific Ocean. It was also labeled by the Army Corps of Engineers as the greatest flood hazard west of the Mississippi after the Flood of 1938. 116 The March 3, 1938 Flood followed days of heavy rain. Sixtyeight thousand acres were flooded in the county with much of Anaheim and the city of Orange under four feet of water. Even more destructive was the peak flow of an earlier flood in 1862, which was measured at 320,000 cfs. 117 The state of California earlier suffered a mammoth flooding in 1861-1862, when a series of storms struck the West Coast. Sixty-six inches of rain fell in Los Angeles. 118 114. The rains come, promoting new growth of vegetation, but also causing flooding, erosion, and landslides. The rains cease, and years of drought set in. The lush vegetation turns into dry vegetation. Something causes a wildfire, which spreads quickly through the dry tinder box, often aided by winds. The fires leave the land bare, facilitating heavy flooding and erosion when the rains return.
115. Nathan Masters, The Santa Ana River: How It Shaped Orange County, KCETLINK (Nov. 12, 2012), https://www.kcet.org/shows/lost-la/the-santa-ana-riverhow-it-shaped-orange-county. to the side of the river, and lasted four weeks. 120 The Central Valley was a lake up to thirty feet deep in water. 121 Sacramento was submerged under ten feet of water. 122 Northern Mexico, Oregon, Washington, British Columbia, Arizona, Nevada, and Utah were also subject to severe flooding. 123 A series of dams and channelization have controlled the Santa Ana's streamflow, as they have on the neighboring Los Angeles and San Gabriel Rivers. Otherwise much of the Los Angeles Plain would be periodically uninhabitable. The Prado Dam, built in 1941, and the Seven Oaks Dam, constructed in 1999, coupled with cement channelization of portions of the Santa Ana riverbed have contained the river in recent years, but both dams have design limits. For example, the Seven Oaks Dam is designed for a 350-year flood. 124 The 1862 Flood was viewed as a 1,000-year flood. 125 California remains at risk for mega-storms in the form of "atmospheric rivers", unleashing heavy flooding on a 200-year basis. The dams, levees, and channels will not control or contain the precipitation. 126 The eight counties south of the Tehachapi Mountains are an example of humans tempering, but not controlling, nature. The Los Angeles basin is ringed by the Pacific Ocean and a chain of mountains, most notably the Hollywood Hills, the San Gabriel Mountains, the Santa Ana Mountains, the Verdugos, and the Santa Monica Mountains. 127 The hills are subject to wildfires, landslides, and flash flooding.
Scott Gold,
Vicious stream flows emerge from the mountains during heavy rains. The risk remains of flooding, landslides, and avalanches at the foothills of the mountains. A major flood overwhelming the dam system might still strike the Los Angeles plain. John McPhee in his classic book, The Control of Nature, 128 wrote that the public built "debris basins" in downstream areas to catch the debris, including "rivers of boulders" coming out of the San Gabriel Mountains during heavy rainfalls. 129 
IV. RISK REDUCTION MEASURES
We can temper many of the forces of nature, but can never tame nature. We can, for example, stop most flooding (though not in cases of extreme precipitation). To the extent that we cannot control the forces of nature, we need to prepare in advance to reduce the impacts. Earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, and tsunamis will not be deterred by our acts, but the damage and impact can be reduced through several actions. Humans are not helpless against even extreme acts of nature. The purpose of this article is not to list every risk reduction or mitigation measure, natural hazard by natural hazard. Instead, it lays out a few general principles and problems. For example, even if we cannot stop development in risky areas, the risks can be moderated by effective and enforced building codes, professional standards, and statutes. 
A. Development Bans or Restrictions
One solution to minimizing the risks from natural hazards would be to avoid living in areas subject to extreme risks, such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, New Orleans or Seattle. A "natural" disaster may involve forces of nature, but the tragedy may be of human origin in geologically fragile areas with a high population density. 130 The thesis is that humans create 
See Denis Binder, The Duty to Disclose Geologic Hazards in Real Estate
Transactions, 1 CHAP. L. REV. 13, 45 (1998).
the risk by moving into the natural hazard. Humans turn the forces of nature into disasters. 131 This thesis was advanced by the famous philosopher Rousseau after the Great Lisbon Earthquake of November 1, 1755. The earthquake, estimated to be an 8.5 on the Richter scale, 132 was followed by a fire and tsunami. 133 Much of the city was destroyed by this horrific trifecta of perils. An estimated 60,000 people perished in the disaster. 134 Most of the city's churches were destroyed on All Saints Day, giving rise to the claim that the earthquake was an act of God. 135 131. In this respect, the term "natural disaster" can be viewed as an oxymoron. Rousseau wrote to Voltaire "that it was hardly nature who assembled twenty-thousand houses of six or seven stories. If the residents of this large city had been more evenly dispersed and less densely housed, the losses would have been fewer or perhaps none at all." 136 The seemingly simple solution would therefore be to live in areas risk free from geological or meteorological risks. This approach is untenable. Three hundred and twenty-four million Americans must live somewhere as do seven billion people globally. 137 A hazards map of the United States looking at seismic, volcanic, hurricane, tornado, flooding, and wildfire threats will show basically no safe zone. 138 People often continue to live in geologically and meteorologically unsafe areas because they have no viable alternative.
MARK MOLESKY, THIS GULF
Most disaster losses are perforce on built environments. For example, an earthquake in the barren desert will not cause the same losses in human lives, property damages, and economic losses as a similar seismic event in a large metropolitan area. 139 So too with hurricanes striking a deserted coast rather
The act of God defense has been refined over the past century to have two elements: 1) an unforeseeable event; and 2) the absence of human fault in causing the damages. Thus, if an act of God coalesces with a human act, then the defense fails. Binder at 17-18. For example, excessive precipitation may be an act of God, but building in floodplains and filling wetlands are acts of humans.
If an event has happened before, then it is foreseeable that it will happen again. A disaster may be the result of an uncontrollable natural cause, but it is not unforeseeable if it occurred before. 138. See supra notes 13-32 and accompanying text.
139. An earthquake of 7.0 magnitude knocked an Amtrak train off its tracks with four passengers injured. The epicenter of the earthquake was in the Mojave Desert by the Twentynine Palms Marine Base. The earthquake was felt in Las Vegas and Los Angeles. About 250,000 temporarily lost power, but no major damage ensued. Tom than a coastal city. 140 The larger the population, the greater the potential disaster. 141 Therefore, areas subject to severe natural risks are often densely populated with the risks of nature compounded by the human built environment.
One measure to reduce risk is to ban development in areas subject to extreme natural hazards. That approach, though, may run afoul of the Takings Clause and thus encounters constitutional barriers. The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause 142 can serve as a restraint on public officials seeking to restrict development in perilous areas. Justice Black in his majority opinion in Armstrong v. United States 143 wrote the purpose of the Takings Clause is "designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens, which in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." 144 This right is not absolute.
The conundrum arises in that the government can exercise the "police power" to protect the public. 145 The government can thereby engage in reasonable regulations to protect the public. The police power includes "everything essential to the public safety, health, and morals, and to justify the destruction or abatement . . . of whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance." 146 The government can also destroy property under this power. 147 The problem is drawing a line between a reasonable regulation and a taking. A definitive interpretation of the takings issue has defied jurists and commentators. Thus, Justice Brennen acknowledged in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 148 "[T]his Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than disproportionately concentrated in a few persons." 149 Unsurprisingly, past attempts to restrict development in floodplains have been unsuccessful, absent acquiring the land. 150 Attempts An alternative, though, is for the government to acquire lands, such as those subject to periodic flooding. One way to accomplish that task is through conservation easements. 154 
B. Design Limits as a Constraint on Eliminating Natural Risks
Society responds to disasters by enacting safety codes, such as building standards, fire codes, and health and safety requirements. In addition, professional groups promulgate professional standards. 155 These pre-incident building standards, building codes, fire codes, health and safety codes, and professional standards can minimize the impact of extreme hazards. Emergency action and business continuity plans can affect response and recovery. Public officials may be trained and tested in emergency responses.
These measures are standard restrictions in the United States to minimize natural hazards. They can be effective in reducing many risks, but may have limits when it comes to extreme natural hazards.
Both natural objects, such as rivers, and human developments have design limits. If a river exceeds its carrying capacity, then flooding occurs. The effectiveness of any preventative, redundancy, resiliency, or response measure is dependent upon its design limits. For example, a bridge designed to resist a twenty-five-year-flood could wash away in a forty-two to fifty-five year-flood. 156 Every facility and structure has design limits which does not usually, and perhaps cannot, protect against extreme geological or meteorological risks. Structures, such as bridges, canals, channels, dams, highways, skyscrapers, and tunnels, (1978) . The twenty-five-year flood is one expected to occur once every twenty-five years on average. The forty-two to fifty-five-year flood event would thus be expected to roughly occur twice in a century.
are necessary for civilization to survive and minimize natural risks. All, though, have design limits; they will provide little protection against a force of nature that exceeds those limits.
Design limits are based on many factors, including foreseeable risks, legal requirements, professional codes and standards, costs, cost/benefit and risk/benefit analysis, and available technology. Problems can also exist with improper designs and shoddy construction.
A clear example of design tradeoffs is the levee system. The most severe hurricanes are classified at Category 5. The rebuilt levee system around New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina is only for a 100-year storm hurricane. 157 Cost and utility are important tradeoffs in designs. We intuitively understand that a small, economical car will probably be less safe in an accident than a large SUV, but the tradeoffs include increased fuel economy and affordability. The drive for absolute safety can render the end product uneconomical.
Design limits are, in turn, dependent upon the quality of the design, construction, modifications, maintenance, operations, inspections, and improvements. The Fukushima disaster is an example of an original design meeting the safety standards at the time of construction, but a failure to upgrade as changes in risk awareness and technology improvements arise.
The However, a tsunami of thirteen to fifteen meters high struck fifty minutes later. It swept over the complex's ten-meter-high seawall, destroying the emergency generators cooling the six reactors. Both the earthquake and tsunami were of epic proportions.
The fault lay with TEPCO. The nuclear complex met the safety standards at the time they were constructed. TEPCO, however, later received warnings that they were inadequate in light of the foreseeable risks. TEPCO failed to make improvements in light of these warnings. 159 Thus, it was unprepared for a foreseeable event. 160 TEPCO subsequently admitted fault. 161 Design limits are also based on the state of the art-what the professionals reasonably believed at the time. Knowledge and technology change over time. Gains in technology are often based upon learning from one's mistakes.
Professor Henry Petroski's book, To Engineer is Human, 162 provides a fascinating look at how civil engineering has advanced through the ages upon its mistakes. Katrina is the greatest human caused engineering disaster in American history. A post-Katrina assessment of the disaster concluded that while the storm exceeded design levels, the structures did not perform as designed. 163 A tradeoff will often exist between safety and utilization. Only eight mobile homes out of roughly 1,300 survived Hurricane Andrew in Homestead, Florida in 1980. The federal government weighed tightening the mobile home wind safety nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/fukushimaaccident.aspx.
159. Neither TEPCO nor the government regulators took or required action in light of the revised risks. Id.
160. One result of the inaction is that the former president and two vice presidents of TEPCO were indicted on manslaughter charges.
161. TEPCO admitted it had made no safety improvements since 2002 even though it knew they were needed. Their 5.7 meter high seawall was insufficient to restrain the fourteen meter high tsunami. [w]e could make these homes completely safe and solid-so much so that they'd be out of reach for lower-income consumers." 165 The limits appear in attempting to minimize risks, as shown by a tornado that struck Moore, Oklahoma on May 20, 2013. Twenty-four deaths occurred, including seven school children when the tornado struck their elementary school. The school lacked a tornado shelter. 166 Discussions ensued after the tragedy about putting tornado shelters in schools. 167 The problem with many buildings is retrofitting an existing structure. The costs and technological challenges make retrofitting unfeasible in many instances.
However, design criteria are irrelevant if the actual design is flawed or negligence exists in the construction and implementation of the design, operations, or maintenance. For example, the Teton Dam in Idaho failed on June 9, 1976 during its initial filling due to poor design and construction decisions. Eleven deaths were recorded while about 25,000 were left homeless and nearly three-hundred square miles were flooded. 168 A large number of poor engineering decisions occurred, but the problems were as much institutional within the Bureau of Reclamation as engineering: "[a]n internal Bureau of Reclamation study states that 'past experiences at other dam sites may have given the USBR designers an unwarranted sense of confidence . . . .'" 169 Similarly, a study of Hurricane Andrew's devastating impact on Florida attributed much of the damage to a combination of "inappropriate design, weak building materials, poor construction techniques, inadequate inspection and other similar failings." 170 
C. Emergency Action Plans
Emergency action plans (EAPs) are a widely accepted method today to respond to emergencies. They should be an integral part of the planning process to minimize risk, if not of the initial impact of the force of nature, but the impacts of the impacts of the blow, and to facilitate recovery. 171 EAPs need to be site specific, risk based, and user friendly. 172 Users need to be familiar with the plan and subject to periodic training on it. 173 EAPs also need to be updated, not gathering dust on a shelf. 174 EAPs can only be as effective as their quality and implementation. For example, Louisiana Governor Blanco and New Orleans Mayor Nagin had ample warning of the approach of Hurricane Katrina, yet both dithered before calling for an evacuation. 175 The mayor was reported to have consulted with the city's attorneys about potential legal liability by the city to the businesses who would lose revenue from an evacuation. 176 Policymakers learn from disasters and the weaknesses of EAPs in responding to them. The failure of the New Orleans EAP also showed multiple problems with evacuation plans. Provisions must exist to evacuate the elderly, infirm, and disabled. 177 Any presumption that they could be evacuated with the general population was proven false by Katrina. Another issue that arose was that some people would not leave without their pets. Hence, a recognition now exists that consideration must be given to this reality. 178 Learning lessons from past response efforts will improve future responses, but the reality is that the extreme forces of nature can overwhelm the best designs and EAPs. They can minimize the impact of these forces, but cannot defeat them.
D. Warning Systems
One means to reduce the impacts of extreme natural hazards is the widespread use of warning systems. Timely warning systems allow for informed decision-making on preparedness and deciding whether to evacuate or shelter inplace. Mass evacuations on short notice will probably be ineffective as roads become congested and panic sets in.
Warnings about the general geological or meteorological risks will probably be no more effective in discouraging people from inhabiting these areas than cigarette warnings in discouraging smoking. 179 The more significant warnings, therefore, will be those in advance of an impact, such as a reverse 911 alert system. 180 For example, the loci of a tornado touching down may be unknown until it occurs, but communities throughout Tornado Alley will sound their sirens in advance of the tornado. Residents scamper to cover; they do not wait to see where the tornado will touch. So too with evacuation orders prior to a hurricane striking, even though the precise path of the storm is unpredictable. An estimated 230,000-280,000 persons died in the tsunami that followed the Sumatra-Andaman Earthquake of December 26, 2004. Waves up to fifty-seven feet struck twelve countries. 181 The victims had no warnings. 182 Conversely, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration reported in 2010 that its tsunami warning system had a 100 percent effective rate for its area of responsibility since the 2005 fiscal year. 183 
V. THE HUMAN FACTOR
No human activity is risk free. People usually make the right decision, rise to the occasion, and often achieve greatness. We do not usually hear of the persons whose decisions averted a "natural" disaster. Conversely, humans also have a seemingly infinite way of being fallible. The reality is that many "natural" disasters will include a human component of fault.
People are fallible. We all have character defects. Arrogance, vacillating, under meds, the not invented here syndrome, avariciousness, judgment calls, indecisiveness, and fear of making a wrong decision, characterize poor decisions. History is full of incidents of poor leadership in crises. 184 Human risks also sadly include corruption, 185 derelictions of duty, and corner cutting.
Another human reality is that people do not heed warnings or are even indifferent to the risks. A classic example was eighty-three-year-old Harry Randall Truman who owned a lodge at Spirit Lake for over fifty years near Mount St. Helens. He was warned about the risks of the eruption but refused to evacuate. 186 He said "I'm going to stay right here because, I'll tell you why, my home and my (expletive deleted) life's here . . . . My wife and I, we both vowed years and years ago that we'll never leave Spirit Lake. We loved it. It's part of me, and I'm part of that (expletive deleted) mountain." 187 Geologic and meteorological quiescence leads to complacency and overconfidence. The attitude is that since nothing has happened, it must be safe. Memories are also short. Measures to reduce risk are part of infrastructure improvements, which involve budgetary constraints. In terms of public budget shortages, infrastructure suffers on two overlapping realities. First, "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." Second, the squeaky wheel of infrastructure-the general belief is that because nothing has gone wrong, it is safe. When the dam bursts, then society pours much more into the infrastructure, much more than preventative maintenance. 188 The result is a ticking time bomb of deferred maintenance.
Others are willing to accept general levels of risk. One Oakland resident living on the Hayward Fault stated: "[l]iving here is a considered risk . . . . [b] ut I love this area, and I'd rather live to be 50 in the Bay Area than 100 in Kansas." 189 The desire to commune with nature, live with nature, exalt in its beauty and views, and to respond to the siren calls of natural beauty, is irresistible to many. To escape from the crowded land and live by the sea 190 is an aspiration of many.
We also deal with conscious denial of the risk-"It won't happen to me." One commentator wrote of the hurricane risk on the East Coast:
Theirs is the familiar beach barrier tale of hope against hope, trust that shoreline engineering can fool Mother Nature, reliance on the great faucet of Government disaster aid and cheap storm insurance and ultimately, denial of the obvious-that is, that all up and down the Atlantic Coast, the sea, aided by storms and hurricanes, is slowly but inexorably rolling up and over beaches. 191 People may often be unaware of the risk. They may not realize, for example, that they are at risk of a flood because an upstream dam provides a delusion of safety.
The desire often exists to rebuild in the same place in the same way. A team of engineers recommended stricter building codes after Hurricane Iwa struck Kauai in 1982. Their intent was to keep roofs from blowing off structures in future hurricanes. 192 The Kauai County Council waived building permits for "emergency repairs." 193 Permittees for the following year were allowed to retroactively obtain permits. "Hurricane connectors," which attach the rafters to the wall frames, were 190. I had a poster once that showed a person looking out over the ocean. The caption was "I fled from the land and arrived at last by the infinite sea." I recognized the scene as being at Ocean Beach in San Francisco. not required for another three years. 194 Hurricane Iniki came in 1992 to Kauai with devastating results. 195 Regardless of zoning, land use plans, or planning boards, political pressures exist to develop and build in geologically fragile areas, such as floodplains or slippery slopes. The development of the Big Rock Mesa in Malibu, California, is a prime example of this costly reality. 196 County engineers recognized the instability of the slopes in the 1960s. The hills and slopes of Malibu, with their majestic views of the ocean and the exclusivity of the community, send out a siren call to the affluent. 197 Staff unsuccessfully tried to forestall development pending installation of sewers for waste water development. Political pressures overcame their opposition. Building permits were issued and homes built. The use of septic tanks 198 The march of civilization and the American people has proven the human race is capable of prodigious feats. It can feed the world's population. It can mine the earth's natural resources in hot humid climates or bitterly freezing, sub-zero weather. It can level mountains, bridge chasms, and make swamps habitable through drainage, filling, and air conditioning. But humans cannot tame the basic primeval forces of nature-the uncontrollable, extreme natural hazards. These natural risks defy control by humans. The time has come to recognize extreme natural hazards as uncontrollable events that can defy design limits and emergency planning because of their speed and ferocity.
Americans spent 360 years reengineering nature to fit their needs. Earth Day on April 17, 1969 and the enactment of National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 marked the end of the period of resource exploitation and the redesign of nature. Scores of environmental protection statutes followed at the federal, state, and local level. The quality of life became as critical as the quantity of life. The paradigm shifted from resource exploitation to resource conservation. Minimum stream flows were imposed on rivers to protect fish and habitat. The Age of the Big Dam was over. 201 Yet, natural hazards persist in spite of the engineering of America. Indeed, much of America is dependent on a century of pre-Earth Day infrastructure. We have to accept, and do accept, a degree of risk in our habitations. It is impossible in as vast and diverse society as the United States to protect against all threats everywhere in the country. Structures fail. Systems malfunction. Humans err.
Let us understand that we can temper many of the forces of nature, but can never tame nature. Engineers have done a remarkable record of containing most, but not all, natural risks. Uncontrollable risks defy their best efforts. We can, for example, stop most flooding, but not cases of extreme precipitation when flood waters reach the flood levels of a river.
To the extent that we cannot control the forces of nature, we 
